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European  Attitudes towards the Management of Ethnic Diversity 
Concepts, Dimensions and Individual Factors 
SUMMARY 
 
Although the management of ethnic diversity in West European societies gave rise to many 
academic researches, few studies dealt with public attitudes on that crucial political issue. We 
address this lacuna by attempting to conceptualize, measure, and explain European attitudes 
towards the management of ethnic diversity. From a theoretical point of view, it is first argued 
that issues related to individual equality should be crucially distinguished from issues related 
to cultural difference. Using unpublished data from the Group Focus Enmity European survey 
(N=1109), we then ask whether public attitudes reflect this fundamental distinction. These 
attitudes are expected to break into separate dimensions (H1); show a proper, significant 
effect on public preferences towards concrete integration policies (H2); and differ in their 
individual, explanatory variables (H3). Results (factor and regression analyses) confirm these 
expectations. Notably, we show that only the Cultural Difference dimension is significantly 
affected by the Perception of Islam and Cultural Threat. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Ethnic diversity resulting from large scale immigration is one of the most prominent 
challenges facing Western European democracies. In recent years, the political management 
of this diversity has raised such major issues as the wearing of the Islamic headscarf in French 
public schools, the pitfalls of British Multiculturalism (Modood, 2007), or the limits of the 
Dutch model regarding the socioeconomic integration of migrants (Hagendoorn and al., 
2003). Though these debates have remained country-specific, governments in Western Europe 
 3 
face similar problems, ranging from the extent to which cultural specificities should be 
tolerated and sustained, to institutional provisions that aim to prevent ethnic exclusion and 
discrimination. In other terms, West European democracies have to define the political 
options governing the coexistence of different ethnic groups within a nation-state1. 
 The issue has given rise to many studies in the academic literature, especially from a 
normative philosophical point of view (Kymlicka, 1996; Taylor and al., 1994), as well as 
historical, legal and public policy perspective (Favell, 2003; Heckmann, Schnapper, 2003). 
Public attitudes are often acknowledged as crucial given that historical national integration 
models are currently under pressure and widely contested (Brubaker, 2001). Nevertheless, we 
still know few about European attitudes towards the management of ethnic diversity. Indeed, 
much of the existing research has dealt with attitudes towards ethnic minorities themselves 
and ethnic prejudice, rather than towards the political options governing the so called 
“integration” of these minorities. This article is an attempt to conceptualize, measure and 
explain attitudes towards the management of ethnic diversity in Western Europe. 
It starts by asking what we know about these attitudes, especially in a European 
comparative perspective. It then deals with conceptual issues and research questions. As far as 
the management of ethnic diversity is concerned, a conceptual distinction is made between 
issues related to individual equality on one hand, and cultural difference on the other hand, a 
                                                 
1
 Through this article, the management of ethnic diversity is defined as the political options governing the 
coexistence of different ethnic groups within a nation-state. It includes both issues related to ethnic or racial 
equality, and issues related to the tolerance of cultural difference. In the academic literature, the management of 
ethnic diversity is often referred to as « integration models » or « integration regimes » (Koopmans and al., 
2005), in reference to the so-called integration of ethnic minorities. This notion, though less precise, is of 
common use, and shall be employed in the course of the article as the equivalent of the management of ethnic 
diversity. We shall then refer to « attitudes towards the management of ethnic diversity » or simply « attitudes 
towards integration ». 
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distinction we argue is of fundamental relevance in many respects. A limited number of 
empirical questions are then specified, answers to which may provide an initial understanding 
of attitudes towards integration. We first ask whether these attitudes break into several 
dimensions, specifically reflecting the theoretical distinction between issues related to 
individual equality and cultural difference (H1, cultural / individual equality distinction 
hypothesis). If attitudes towards the management of ethnic diversity are revealed to be 
multidimensional, it can be expected that each dimension shows a proper effect on precise, 
specific integration policies or issues (H2, consequential distinction hypothesis). Finally, we 
test whether the individual causes or explanatory variables of these attitudes vary from one 
dimension to another. The hypothesis is made that the effect of a given independent variable 
differs according to the dimension of these attitudes (H3, causal difference hypothesis). In 
particular, attitudes towards Islam and the perception of a cultural threat may have a greater 
effect, and even only affect, attitudes towards cultural difference.  
The analysis is based on the pre-test (N=1109) of the European survey, Group Focused 
Enmity 2008 (GFE), as yet unpublished2. Based on the interdisciplinary GFE research project, 
this survey includes many attitudinal variables related to the management of ethnic diversity 
                                                 
2
 The GFE project was led by Wilhelm Heitmeyer, University of Bielefeld (Germany). It aims at understanding 
attitudes towards a diversity of groups possibly facing public enmity (migrants, ethnic and religious minorities, 
women, etc.) The survey has been conducted in seven West European countries (about 150 interviewees per 
country): France, Germany, Great-Britain, Italy, Portugal, Sweden and the Netherlands. East European countries 
have also been surveyed. Nevertheless, it has been our choice in this article not to compare East and West 
European countries, due to the differences regarding the political history, the history of immigration, the 
minorities living in each country and, as a consequence, the issues and debates towards integration. 
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and its possible causes, which have been absent from previous cross-national surveys dealing 
with racial or ethnic attitudes3. 
 
Conceptual issues and research questions 
 
The lack of comparative and European research on attitudes towards integration  
  
European surveys and research have not focused much on attitudes towards the 
management of ethnic diversity. Attitudinal studies concerned with ethnicity have mostly 
dealt with attitudes towards ethnic minorities themselves or ethnic prejudice. As far as related 
policies or political options are concerned, the focus has been on immigration and asylum 
issues (Citrin, Sides, 2008 ; Davidov and al., 2008 ; Fetzer J., 2000 ; McLaren, 2001 ; 
Scheepers and al., 2002) – i.e. who should come and live in a given nation-state – rather than 
issues linked to the management of ethnic diversity – i.e. policies and political options 
regarding the coexistence of ethnic minorities with a dominant ethnic majority group. As their 
titles indicate, European and international attitudinal surveys dealing with ethnicity thus tend 
to focus on “racism” (special Eurobarometers 1988, 1997 and 2000), “national identities” 
(International Social Survey Programme 1995 and 2003), or “attitudes towards immigration 
and asylum issues” (European Social Survey 2002 special module). Indicators related to the 
                                                 
3
 The main survey does not include so many questions dealing with integration, and thus does not allow 
measuring as many dimensions of attitudes towards integration as the pre-test does. Indeed, although these 
questions has revealed to be empirically relevant, the questionnaire had to be reduced, and measuring attitudes 
towards integration was not the main goal of the GFE project. 
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management of ethnic diversity, although not totally absent from these comparative surveys, 
remain scarce and have not received much attention in their subsequent analyses4. 
Some recent attitudinal studies, although not necessarily comparative, have dealt with 
the aspect of the management of ethnic diversity that is referred to as multiculturalism. This is 
the case for Sniderman and Hagendoorn’s When Ways of Life Collide (Sniderman, 
Hagendoorn, 2007), or the work of Kymlicka and his colleagues, Multiculturalism and the 
Welfare State (Kymlicka, Banting eds., 2007). However the focus is not on attitudes towards 
multiculturalism in themselves: it is rather on the impact of multicultural policies on 
hypothetically related phenomena, such as exclusionary reactions to immigration and 
migrants (Sniderman), or welfare state policies and attitudes towards them (Kymlicka). 
Furthermore, these studies concentrate on multiculturalism, which is only one aspect of what 
this article is about: in addition to its cultural aspect, the management of ethnic diversity 
raises major issues of socioeconomic equality and discrimination. Thus, we are aware of no 
attempt to systematically conceptualise, measure and explain attitudes towards the 
management of ethnic diversity in European societies5. 
 
Individual Equality versus Cultural Recognition: conceptual distinctions 
 
The management of ethnic diversity is defined as the set of political options governing 
the coexistence of ethnic minority and majority groups within the same nation-state. This 
                                                 
4
 A few questions have been asked about preferences for cultural homogeneity as opposed to diversity 
(International Social Survey Programme), or the issue of equal rights between ethnic minorities and the rest of 
the population (Eurobarometers). 
5
 Typically, there exists no major debate on public preferences toward integration policies in Western Europe, 
such as you might see in the US concerning public opposition to affirmative action. 
 
 7 
article does not focus on public preferences about precise, specific policies or debates. 
Instead, the main concern is for the broad general attitudes regarding the management of 
ethnic diversity, which would orient preferences on more specific issues. At this general level, 
some conceptual distinctions may underlie the empirical investigation of public attitudes. In 
pursuit of this, a fundamental distinction can be made between issues related to individual 
equality and those related to cultural difference (Koopmans and al., 2005). In Western 
democracies, the presence of ethnic minorities revives traditional issues about socio-economic 
and political equality. Are individuals whose ethnic background differs from that of the 
majority, granted equal rights and chances in both the socioeconomic and political domains?  
These questions touch on issues of individual equality in the sense that claims for equality – 
including racial or ethnic equality – in the socioeconomic and political domains do not 
diverge from the traditional liberal and individualistic conception of equal rights and chances. 
Any individual, whatever their particular background, should be granted equal opportunities 
for success in  society. 
 Different from these issues of individual equality, are issues related to cultural 
difference. To what extent are minority cultural practices officially tolerated, valued, 
sustained and even promoted, particularly if they are expressed in the public sphere? Culture 
is a group attribute and some issues related to cultural difference only apply to individuals 
with a specific cultural minority background. Claims for cultural recognition are generally 
made in the name of groups rather than in terms of individual rights and equality. They may 
also be made in the name of cultures themselves, emphasising, for example, the need to 
preserve them as part of the heritage of humanity (Taylor, 1992). In any case, whereas liberal 
philosophers essentially promoted individual equality, they tended to oppose cultural rights 
and the official recognition of minority cultures6. 
                                                 
6
 Kymlicka (1996) acknowledges that fact, even if he himself formulates a liberal theory of minority rights. 
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Thus, as far as the management of ethnic diversity is concerned, issues in individual 
equality can be distinguished from cultural difference issues on a conceptual or philosophical 
level. But the distinction is not only a theoretical one. From a historical point of view, the first 
claim for equality between the different groups within society was for individual equality 
(Marshall, Bottomore, 1987). More specifically, it concerned formal equal rights. As far as 
ethnic minorities are concerned, this claim equates to the absence or suppression of official 
segregation and discrimination. It conceives equality in opposition to unequal chances and 
discrimination and recognises this at the state level, thus constituting a basic component of 
democratic regimes. 
 Next came the claims for actual rather than formal equality, based on the idea that the 
fundamental requirements of formal equality do not suffice to ensure concrete equality and 
inclusion of disadvantaged groups. Historically, this view sustained welfare rights movements 
(Baldwin, 2008). As far as ethnic minorities are concerned, it sustained multiple claims and 
political provisions – including affirmative action policies – that go beyond the basic 
requirements for formal equality. Unlike the principle of equal rights, the implementation of 
policies or legal provisions aimed at actually including ethnic minorities is not an explicit 
requirement of democracy. But as for the provision of equal rights, the issue remains 
individual equality in the socioeconomic and political domain7. 
 More recent are the claims for cultural recognition of ethnic minorities, and policies 
referred to as multiculturalism. Here, the claim is not so much (or not only8) individual 
equality as the preservation, valuation and recognition of cultural practices specific to certain 
                                                 
7
 Typically, liberal philosophers do not systematically oppose these policies (Kymlicka, 1991). 
8
 The concept of multiculturalism has been applied to a wide variety of policies and practices, that have been 
sustained by different arguments. Individual equality has been one of those. But the important here is that claims 
for cultural recognition have often been made in the name of groups rather than in terms of individual rights and 
equality. 
 9 
groups, that may imply the recognition of group rights, i.e. rights that only apply to a given 
ethnic or cultural minority (Kymlicka, 1996)9. 
 Multiculturalism has been underlain by the idea that any culture has an extrinsic value, 
and the valuation of cultural diversity per se. But such considerations are not relevant as far as 
socioeconomic and individual equality is concerned. Also noticeable is the fact that whilst 
equal rights and provisions for actual equality are expected to favor cohesion and the 
inclusion of disadvantaged minorities, cultural recognition is feared to bring about the 
opposite result, i.e. to impede social cohesion. Moreover, in West European countries, issues 
related to cultural recognition have been specifically associated with the theme of Islam. 
Indeed, most countries in Western Europe have substantial Muslim populations – or are likely 
to have them in the near future. This situation has given rise to many academic and public 
debates about the so called “integration of Muslim minorities”, which has been seen as one of 
the most dominant challenges associated with the management of ethnic diversity. As a 
consequence, debates and issues related to cultural recognition often directly or indirectly 
refer to the cultural specificities of Muslims10. 
 Thus, the claims for individual equality on one hand and cultural recognition on the 
other hand have been sustained by distinct arguments and considerations. We can then ask 
whether this distinction remains relevant as far as public opinion is concerned. 
  
Hypotheses and research design 
                                                 
9
 Typically, liberal philosophers tended to oppose these policies (Kymlicka, 1991). 
10
 Moreover, issues related to individual equality and cultural recognition can be distinguished from the point of 
view of public policy. In a European comparative perspective, Koopmans and his colleagues (Koopmans and al., 
2005) observed that there is no systematic relationship between a society’s policies on individual equality and 
cultural recognition (i.e. a country may  defend policies that are comparatively “generous towards minorities” on 
one  issue but not on the other). 
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Dimensions of attitudes towards integration  
 
  The assumption is made that the European public does distinguish between issues 
related to individual equality on one hand, and cultural difference on the other hand, thus: 
  
H1 (cultural/individual equality distinction hypothesis)―Western European attitudes towards 
the management of ethnic diversity can be broken down into several dimensions, which 
specifically reflect the theoretical distinction between individual equality and cultural 
recognition. In statistical terms, this means that items relating to each issue would fall into 
separate factors11. 
 
 General attitudes towards integration, and the potential dimensions of these attitudes, 
are expected to guide preferences to do with specific, more concrete related policies. Thus, a 
complementary hypothesis is made about the effect of these dimensions. Here, the different 
dimensions of attitudes towards integration are expected to differ in their consequences 
(consequential distinction hypothesis). More specifically, the hypothesis is made that each 
dimension of public attitudes towards integration has a specific effect on public preferences 
towards more concrete, specific integration policies. This would both provide supplementary 
evidence of the distinction between these dimensions, as well as confirm their relevance so as 
to understand the causes of public opinion towards concrete, specific integration issues. The 
assumption is thus made that: 
 
                                                 
11
 Due to the lack of previous research regarding the (potential) dimensions of attitudes towards integration, this 
test shall be based on exploratory factor analysis, thus allowing unexpected dimensions or factors to emerge. 
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H2 (consequential distinction hypothesis)―Each dimension of attitudes towards integration 
has a proper, specific effect on preferences towards precise, concrete integration policies. In 
statistical terms, it is expected that the effect of each dimension of attitudes towards 
integration on a specific integration policy will persist when it is controlled for the effect of 
the other dimensions12. 
 
Individual causes of attitudes towards integration 
 
Furthermore, attitudes towards integration shall be investigated from the point of view of their 
causes or individual variables. Which individual variables – socio-demographic (age, 
education level, etc.) and above all attitudinal (left-right identification, attitudes towards 
Islam, etc.) – can be expected to affect European attitudes towards integration? And does each 
relevant variable equally affect the different dimensions of these attitudes ? The hypothesis is 
made that it does not, i.e. that the effect of a given variable is not the same according to the 
dimension of these attitudes. In particular, attitudes towards Islam and the perception of a 
cultural threat on one’s society are expected to have a greater effect on the Cultural Difference 
dimension. Here, it is even expected that some variables only affect some specific dimensions 
of attitudes towards integration. The assumption is thus made that: 
 
H3 (causal difference hypothesis)―Individual variables can be identified that have a greater 
effect on – and sometimes only affect – one specific dimension of attitudes towards 
integration. This shall be tested by comparing, for each potential dimension and, with 
adequate controls in place, the net effect of the relevant individual variables (multiple 
regression analysis). 
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 The precise test shall be described further on in the article. 
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This would both provide supplementary evidence for the distinction between these 
dimensions, as well as confirm their relevance so as to understand the causes of public 
opinion towards concrete, specific integration issues. Given that they depend on the 
dimensions that will emerge from the analysis, hypothesis about which variables may 
specifically affect which dimension shall be made further on in the article. 
 
Measurement and data 
 
Our analysis is based on the pre-test of the Group Focused Enmity (GFE) survey, 
which was conducted in the second half of September 2006 in France, Germany, Great-
Britain, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands and Sweden (N=1109). 
So as to measure attitudes towards the management of ethnic diversity, two categories 
of items were retained. The first group of items looks at socio-economic and political 
equality, i.e. issues about individual equality (percentages of non responses in brackets): 
 
1. When jobs are scarce, [country natives] should have more right to employment than 
immigrants (2.4%). 
2. People who have always lived here should have more rights than those who came later 
(1.5%). 
3. Newcomers to [country] should be satisfied with less (2.1%). 
4. Immigrants should be allowed to vote in all elections (4.1%). 
5. Immigrants who have been living in [country] for some years should be able to be 
naturalised easily (3.9%). 
6. We should invest more money in supporting immigrant kids13 (3.1%). 
 
Note that items 1 to 3 refer to the most radical, exclusionary way of dealing with 
ethnic minorities and newcomers, i.e. the denial of formal equality or basic equal rights. But 
this is not the case of items 4 to 6. Indeed, they refer to political provisions that go beyond 
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 Interviewees are asked if they strongly/somewhat agree or strongly/somewhat disagree with the following 
statements. Note that these items were not following each other in the questionnaire. 
 13 
the requirements of basic equality14. Whether this distinction remains relevant as far as public 
attitudes are concerned is an empirical question. 
The second group of items does not refer to individual equality any more, but rather 
deals with cultural difference: 
 
7. It is better for a country if there are many different religions (4.9%). 
8. Imigrants should maintain their culture of origin (0.8%). 
9. Immigrants should adapt to [country’s] culture (0.2%). 
 
 The individual variables potentially explaining  attitudes towards integration will be 
detailed in the next section, in relation to specific hypotheses depending on the article’s first 
results.   
 
The dimensions of attitudes towards integration: empirical results 
 
Table 1 presents the result of exploratory factor analysis that tests assumption H1 
(cultural/individual equality distinction hypothesis)15. The factorial solution is very clear, 
with items breaking into three separate dimensions16, with no item substantially loading on 
more than one single factor. 
Items related to individual equality on one hand, and cultural difference on the other 
hand, clearly form separate dimensions, thus confirming H1: the European public does not 
                                                 
14
 Strictly speaking, even migrants’ voting right (item 4) is not a requirement of formal equality. Indeed, 
migrants are not members of the political community (i.e. citizens). See notably Sniderman, Hagendoorn, 2007. 
15
 The method used is principal factor analysis with factorial rotation (direct oblimin).  
16
 We use the Kaiser criterion (eigenvalues greater than 1). The explained variance is 34% for the first factor 
(Equal Rights), 12,5% for the second factor (Socio-political Inclusion), and 11% for the third factor (Cultural 
Difference). 
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perceive cultural difference and individual equality issues as one single issue, but rather 
differentiates between them. 
 In addition, items related to individual equality appear to break into two dimensions. 
The first one refers to equal rights or basic formal equality, i.e. the more fundamental, 
necessary conditions of any equality between different groups in society. The second 
dimension includes items that share a focus on  individual equality but which go beyond the 
basic requirements of formal equality. In the political area, naturalization and foreigners’ 
voting rights express a will to include immigrants in the political community, which exceeds 
what basic fairness and democratic principles formally require – as does the position that 
more money should be invested in supporting immigrant children. The related dimension is 
then referred to as Socio-Political Inclusion – a desire to go beyond the basic requirements of 
formal equality in order to achieve “real” equality, and actually include ethnic minorities 
within society. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
Integration dimensions’ effect on specific preferences 
 
We then tested H2 (consequential distinction hypothesis) that the different dimensions 
of attitudes towards integration have a proper, specific effect on public preferences towards 
precise and concrete integration policies. In pursuit of this, we need an item measuring 
preferences on such a concrete integration policy. The survey asks about the State’s decision 
to forbid or allow the wearing of the Islamic scarf in public schools (non responses in 
brackets): 
 
 15 
― There is a lot of debate today about wearing the headscarf at school. Some people think 
Muslim girls should have the right to wear it at school, others don’t. What do you think 
personally about that? Muslim girls should be allowed to wear it at school / Muslim girls 
should not be allowed to wear it at school (3.1%) 
  
The Islamic scarf question constitutes a precise, concrete issue leading to practical 
policy decisions (i.e. allowing or not allowing Muslim girls to wear it)17. Like most concrete, 
specific integration issues, the wearing of the Islamic scarf in public schools had not been a 
matter of debate in all European countries. It has been first of all a French debate. 
Nevertheless, the French controversy has echoed far beyond the national borders, giving the 
general public an opportunity to think about the issue: “The legal and political tensions 
thrown up by this debate are now being witnessed in many European states. The place of 
religion in schools in general, and wearing of religious dress in State schools in particular, 
has become an issue across Europe (McGoldrick, 2006; see also Fetzer, 2004). In addition, 
empirical results from the GFE survey confirm the salience of the headscarf question in the 
countries of study18. 
So as to test H2 (consequential distinction hypothesis), the Islamic scarf question is 
used as a dependant variable in multiple regression analysis (logistic regression). Attitudinal 
scales related to each dimension have been constructed with the goal of maximizing internal 
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 Furthermore, although the question directly relates to the issue of cultural difference, it is not confined to it. 
Indeed, not allowing the Islamic headscarf in schools, implies excluding those Muslim girls who refuse to 
remove it from public schools, a consequence which goes far beyond cultural matters 
18
 Thus, non-responses remain moderate, i.e. less than 5% for the whole sample. Only Italy (9%) and Sweden 
(11%) have a non-response rate greater than 6%. Nevertheless, removing Italy and Sweden from the analysis 
does not lead to different results and conclusions about H2 (consequential distinction hypothesis). It could also 
be feared that in all countries but France, the opinion is unanimously favourable to the wearing of the Islamic 
scarf in public schools. But this is not the case: the maximum rate of acceptance of the Islamic scarf at school is 
68% in Portugal (the majority of the interviewees being against the wearing of the Islamic scarf at school in Italy 
and Germany). 
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consistency, which resulted in the elimination of two indicators19. This scales are included in 
logistic regression as independent variables. Results are presented in Table 2 (Model 1).  
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
 The effect of each dimension appears to be significant at the .001 level, and resists 
control for the effect of the other dimensions20. In other terms, each dimension of attitudes 
                                                 
19
 “Immigrants should adapt to [country’s] culture” (Cultural Difference dimension), and “More money to 
support immigrant kids” (Socio-political Inclusion). Correlations (Pearson’s R) are between .47 and .55  for the 
Equal Rights scale (three indicators), .44 for Socio-Political Inclusion, and .41 for Cultural Difference. Due to 
the the lack of empirical experience in the measurement of attitudes towards integration, this is considered as 
satisfying. 
For each scale, and when it was possible, non responses have been imputed using responses on the other 
indicator in the scale (or the more closely correlated indicator for scales containing more than two questions). 
Note that due too relatively low non response rates, it each time concerns a very limited number of cases. Cases 
with remaining non responses have been removed from the data set. 
All scales have been built using multiple correspondence analysis. Multiple correspondence analysis takes into 
account the precise contribution of each modality of the variables to the scale or axes. As a result, each 
individual is given a precise score, resulting in a scale with many modalities (even with two indicators in the 
scales; as an example, the Cultural Difference scale has 24 positions, ranging from -1.87 to 2.22). Multiple 
correspondence analysis thus provides scales which are more accurate, but also suitable for linear analysis. As 
scale based on correspondence analysis are not common in the international literature, we also ran models with 
additive scales (results not presented). Although conclusions and models are basically the same, scales based on 
correspondence analysis gave better relations between variables which were expected to be related. So as to test 
H1 (multidimensionality), we preferred principal factor analysis with varimax rotation, which we see as more 
adapted to the identification of clear, separate dimensions. 
 
 
 17 
towards integration has a proper, specific effect on public preferences towards a concrete and 
precise integration issue, thus confirming H2. 
 Nevertheless, it could still be argued that attitudes towards integration are nothing 
more than – or an indirect measurement of – attitudes towards the very groups targeted by 
integration policies, i.e. ethnic minorities themselves. In this hypothesis, the effect of each 
dimension of attitudes towards integration would express nothing more than the effect of 
attitudes towards ethnic minorities. So as to test it, attitudes towards ethnic minorities have 
been added to the former model as independent variables. More precisely, two new variables 
have been included in the model, i.e. general attitudes towards ethnic minorities and 
migrants, as well as attitudes towards Islamic minorities – the very group targeted by 
headscarf policies. Details about the indicators and measurement are presented in Appendix 
1.  
 Results (Table 2, Model 2) show that only the effect of the Equal Rights dimension is 
not significant any more (although close to significance at the .1 level). The effect of the 
Socio-Political Inclusion as well as Cultural Difference dimension remains significant when 
controlled for attitudes towards ethnic minorities (i.e. migrants and Islamic minorities). Thus, 
the effect of attitudes towards integration on public preferences towards a precise, concrete 
integration policy differs from the effect of attitudes towards ethnic minorities themselves. 
This confirm H2, as well as the salience of attitudes towards integration so as to understand 
public preferences on concrete integration policies and issues. 
 
The individual variables of attitudes towards integration 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
20
 The more interviewees’ are favourable to ethnic minorities on a given dimension, the more they accept the 
wearing of the Islamic scarf. 
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Theoretical Model and Hypothesis 
 
We then test H3, that the effect of relevant individual variables substantially differs 
according to the different dimensions of attitudes towards integration (causal difference 
hypothesis). In pursuit of this, we first identify the individual variables expected to affect 
attitudes towards integration in general21. We then make more precise hypothesis about 
which individual variables may have a greater effect on – and sometimes only affect – some 
specific dimensions of attitudes towards integration. 
Different variables have been shown to affect racial or ethnicity-related attitudes 
(Allport, 1992; Brown, 1995; Coenders, Scheepers, 2003; Duckitt, 1994; Sides, Citrin, 2007). 
Three categories of individual variables can be analytically distinguished: ideological or 
axiological, threat-related, and cognitive variables. Variables belonging to these categories 
have been shown to affect attitudes towards ethnic minorities themselves, as well as attitudes 
towards racial or ethnicity-related policies (Coenders, Scheepers, 1998; Schuman and al., 
1998; Sniderman, Hagendoorn, 2007). They are thus expected to affect attitudes towards 
integration. Leftist ideologies (Duckitt, 2001; Feldman, Steenbergen, 2001; Jost and al., 2009; 
Thorisdottir and al., 2007), as well as non-authoritarian values (Adorno, 1950; Lippa, Arad, 
1999; Sidanius, 1988; Whitley, 1999) may underlie public preferences for the more open, 
generous integration options – i.e. those integration policies or options that are largely seen to 
derive from these values. On the contrary, the perception of a threat to the society may lead to 
oppose generous political options, based on the belief that they would even more weaken an 
already threatened society (on perceived threat as a factor of ethnicity-related attitudes, see 
Blumer, 1958; Bobo, 1983; Feldman, 2003; McLaren, 2003; Quillian, 1995; Scheepers and 
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 I.e. variables that may affect one or several dimensions, without discussing at this stage which dimensions 
may be more affected. 
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al., 2002; Sniderman and al., 2004; Wagner and al., 2006). The same way as perceived threat, 
empathy is generally considered to belong to the emotional drivers of ethnicity-related 
attitudes. But it is expected to have the exact opposite effect: it has been shown that empathy 
– a propensity to sympathize or to show some concern for the difficulties affecting ethnic 
minorities – does  foster tolerance towards ethnic minorities (Batson, 1991; Stephan, Finlay, 
1999; Finlay, Stephan, 2000), as well as support for public policies or political options 
favourable to those groups (Craemer, 2005 and 2007). As for cognitive variables, the 
cognitive sophistication associated with a high education level has been seen to foster general 
as well as political tolerance, and may lead to support – or at least not oppose – the more 
generous integration policies and options (Coenders, Scheepers, 2003; Hagendoorn, Nekuee, 
1999; Sullivan and al., 1994; Vogt, 1997). 
Specific hypothesis can now be made about the individual variables relevant to each 
dimension (details about the indicators and measurement are presented in Appendix 1). 
 
Equal Rights— The Equal Rights dimension is the only one to express, through the 
denial of these rights, an opposition to the very principle of ethnic equality – a radical 
position violating the basic requirements of democracy. Such antidemocratic, anti-
equalitarian attitudes have been shown to follow from the commitment to authoritarian 
values (Adorno, 1950; Stone and al., 1993). The assumption is thus made that 
Authoritarianism is particularly relevant to the Equal Rights dimension (i.e. more so that to 
any other dimension of attitudes towards integration; see Appendix 1 for the measurement of 
authoritarian attitudes). 
In the same line of reasoning, the attitudes to ethnic equality that are expressed by the 
Equal Rights dimension may be particularly affected by broader values about equality in 
general (see Appendix 1 for the measurement of Equality Values). As opposition to Cultural 
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Difference and Socio-Political Inclusion does not necessarily imply opposition to the very 
principle of basic equality, the impact of both Authoritarianism and Equality Values may be 
in their case weaker. 
Socio-political Inclusion— This dimension expresses a desire to go beyond the basic 
requirements of formal equality in order to achieve “real” equality, and actually include 
ethnic minorities within the socio-political community. Historically, the claim for real 
equality and inclusion of disadvantaged groups (such as manual workers) within society has 
been typically sustained by leftist institutions or parties. The assumption is thus made that 
Left-right Identification is particularly relevant to the Socio-political Inclusion dimension22.  
In addition, the Socio-political Inclusion dimension may be particularly affected by 
Empathy towards Ethnic Minorities (Appendix 1). Indeed, whereas the acceptation of formal 
equality directly follows from the commitment to democratic principles, the claim for real 
equality that is expressed by Socio-political Inclusion may be guided by different 
considerations. More precisely, individuals who show more concern for the difficulties of 
ethnic minorities may be more prone to support the policies or political options – sometimes 
unpopular – which can be expected to attenuate these difficulties23.  
                                                 
22
 Left-right Identification should be less relevant to the Equal Rights dimension, as it refers to a core democratic 
principle which has been accepted by both sides of the political spectrum. Furthermore, as far as political parties 
are concerned, there does not exist a clear left-right cleavage on the more recent issue of Cultural Difference in 
European societies. 
23
 In other terms, the support of sometimes unpopular political options (Socio-political Inclusion) aimed at 
achieving real equality would require more than the commitment to general principles. On the contrary, the 
support for formal equality (Equal Rights) explicitly follows from the commitment to democratic principles. 
Besides, it is assumed that support for cultural recognition (Cultural Difference) is more guided by 
considerations about diversity and culture than about the difficulties of ethnic minorities. From a general 
perspective, solidarity and the difficulties of ethnic minorities are more often evoked to justify real equality 
between ethnic groups, than when equal rights or cultural recognition are at stake. 
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Cultural Difference—The assumption is made that the Perception of Cultural Threat 
24(Appendix 1) is particularly relevant to the Cultural Difference dimension. Indeed, one of 
the main arguments against some aspects of cultural diversity is that it can be detrimental to 
social cohesion. In this view, the possibility of each cultural group maintaining and 
expressing its specific culture would undermine the basic norms and values sustaining a 
given society. The hypothesis is then made that this fear would be all the more acute if these 
basic norms and values are already perceived, for whatever reason, as threatened – something 
that has been referred to as the perception of (general) cultural threat. As the other 
dimensions of attitudes towards integration do not directly relate to cultural issues, they 
should be less affected by the Perception of Cultural Threat. 
Note that following this, we suppose that it is the specific cultural component of 
threat – rather than the perception of threat in general – which may specifically impact on the 
Cultural Difference dimension. In order to test this, a non cultural specific indicator of threat 
was also included in the model (Inter-group Threat, Appendix 1). We can thus test whether it 
is actually the Perception of Cultural Threat, rather than other sources of threat, which have 
a greater impact on the Cultural Difference dimension. 
In addition, the Cultural Difference dimension is expected to be particularly affected 
by the Perception of Islam as antithetical with democratic principles (Appendix 1). Issues in 
cultural difference and the expression of minority cultures have been typically associated 
with the theme of Islam, in public and normative debates throughout Western Europe. More 
specifically, the so-called Islamic culture and its related norms and values, have been 
                                                 
24
 Sniderman and al. (2004) recently provided empirical evidence that it is societal rather than personal 
perception of threat, and cultural rather than economic threat, which mainly impacts on attitudes towards ethnic 
groups. 
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frequently assumed to oppose Western democratic principles and values. According to this 
perspective, the cultural recognition of Muslim minorities has been suspected of favouring 
the growth of an antidemocratic culture within Western democratic nation-states. We would 
then expect to see attitudes increasingly opposed to Cultural Difference (and the expression 
of minority cultures) the more Islam is perceived as antithetical to Western democracy. 
Whereas one hardly find related indicators in comparative surveys dealing with ethnicity, the 
GFE survey contains two questions on that theme which allow to build a robust scale 
(Appendix 1). 
  These hypothesis are summed up in the table below. Age has been included as 
a control variable. As no specific hypothesis were made about cognitive sophistication 
(Education Level) and Inter-group Threat, both variables appear in the Control variables 
column. 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Testing the causal difference hypotheses 
 
In order to test these hypotheses, three regression analyses have been conducted with 
each dimension of integration as the dependent variable, and with all previously discussed 
variables (socio-demographic and attitudinal) as independent variables25. 
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 As for the independent variables, both linear and non-linear effects were tested (using dummy variables). 
Taking into account the non-linear effects of the independent variables did not give better results. As for the 
dependant variables, scales based on multiple correspondence analysis are suitable to linear regression. Models 
with the dependent variable as a dichotomy (logistic regression) gave less good results. 
Due to the fact that cases with remaining non answers have been removed from the data set, the number 
of individual is equivalent in each model. This allows to compare directly the significance of a given variable 
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TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
 Each individual variable for which we have made specific hypotheses has a 
significant effect on the theoretically related dimension (Table 4, Model 1). Furthermore, the 
effect is always greater – an sometimes only significant – on the theoretically related 
dimension (comparing the significance of the regression coefficients). This clearly confirms 
H3 (Causal Difference Hypothesis). 
Equal Rights 
As expected, Equality Values, and first of all Authoritarianism, have a much greater 
effect on attitudes towards Equal Rights than towards the other dimensions. Whereas the 
effect of Equality Values is significant at P<.000 for Equal Rights, it is only significant at 
p>.05 on the Cultural Difference dimension. Most of all, Equal Rights is the only dimension 
to be significantly affected (p<.000) by Authoritarianism. This provides supplementary 
evidence that attitudes to Socio-Political Inclusion, as well as Cultural Difference, do not 
express a commitment to equality per se. 
                                                                                                                                                        
across the three models. Regression coefficients have been standardized. Although it allows to compare the 
effect of different variables within a same model, this is not the aim of the article. Furthermore, the magnitude of 
the coefficients is also related to the quality of measurement. Then there is not much experience in measuring 
some variables in the model (Perception of Islam, etc.) as compared to others (notably ethnic prejudice). The 
important remains that a previously under-studied phenomenon is shown to significantly affect our dependent 
variable. 
Note that the variables composing both Authoritarianism and Equality Values are part of a split 
procedure in the survey, i.e. they are only available for half of the total sample. The following analysis is thus 
based on half of the sample, which means that hypotheses testing based on significance can be considered as 
particularly demanding. 
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Socio-Political Inclusion 
As has been hypothesized, attitudes to Socio-Political Inclusion are the more 
affected – and even the only ones to be significantly affected (p<.000) – by Left-Right 
Identification. The absence of any effect on Equal Rights may reflect the left-right consensus 
on the need for formal equality. In the case of Cultural Difference, it rather appears as a 
consequence of the fact that there is no clear left-right cleavage on cultural difference issues 
in Western Europe. Finally, the effect of Empathy is revealed to be maximal for Socio-
Political Inclusion (only in that case is it significant at p<.01). 
Cultural Difference 
In accordance with our expectations, Cultural Threat and, above all, Perception of 
Muslim Culture have a greater effect on Cultural Difference than on the two other 
dimensions. Only in that case is the effect of Cultural Threat significant at p<.01, and it is 
not significant at all on the Political Inclusion dimension. Above all, Perception of Muslim 
Culture only has a significant effect on the Cultural Difference dimension. In addition, 
although Cultural Threat has a much greater impact on Cultural Difference than the other 
dimensions, this is no more the case concerning the effect of the non cultural specific Inter-
group Threat. As expected, it is not so much the threat in itself, as its specific cultural 
component that specifically affects attitudes to Cultural Difference. 
This seems to us a crucial result when it comes to the understanding of public 
opposition to cultural difference and related political provisions in West European societies. 
Our analyses provide empirical evidence that on such issues, the European public has in view 
the specific question of Islamic traditions’ compatibility with the principles sustaining 
contemporary democracies. Thus, the political options that European societies shall adopt as 
regard to cultural diversity may depend on the way the very perception of Islam evolves, in 
relation to current debates about the legitimacy of specific demands from Muslim minorities, 
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striking facts and media reports concerning Islamic traditions and, crucially, political parties’ 
positions on such issues. For now, the fact that left-right identification does not affect 
attitudes towards Cultural Difference can be imputed to the absence of a clear, salient left-
right cleavage on that theme. This would mean that public attitudes evolve in parallel with 
changes from the political elite, parties’ repositioning or emerging left-right cleavages on 
those themes. 
Nevertheless, at this stage, the explanatory model of attitudes towards integration 
could be considered as underspecified. Indeed, it does not include ethnic prejudice – i.e. 
attitudes towards ethnic minorities themselves – which can be expected to impact on attitudes 
towards integration. More specifically, it could be argued that the effect of the independent 
variables in the model expresses nothing more than the (indirect) effect of ethnic prejudice. 
In that case, ethnic prejudice – i.e. attitudes to ethnic minorities themselves – would fully 
account for attitudes towards integration. In other terms, the effect of the independent 
variables in the former, underspecified model would reveal to be a spurious one. 
So as to test it, attitudes towards ethnic minorities have been added to the former 
model as independent variables (Model 2). More precisely, two new variables have been 
included in the model, i.e. prejudice towards ethnic minorities and migrants, as well as 
towards Islamic minorities – the very group at the core of many debates about integration 
and, more specifically, cultural difference. Attitudes towards integration may thus be 
specifically affected by attitudes towards Islamic minorities: their inclusion  into the model 
therefore provides a more stringent test for our hypothesis. If the effect of the independent 
variables in the previous model expresses nothing more than the (indirect) effect of ethnic 
prejudice, it shall vanish when it is controlled for both attitudes towards ethnic minorities and 
migrants, and Islamic minorities. 
 26 
Results (Table 4, Model 2) show that ethnic prejudice does indeed have an impact on 
attitudes towards integration. Nevertheless, including ethnic prejudice as a control variable 
does not discount the effect of each variable for which hypotheses have been made. Indeed, 
the effect of these variables remains significant on the theoretically related dimensions26. 
Furthermore, once we have controlled for ethnic prejudice, the effect of several variables on 
non-theoretically related dimensions is not significant any more, thus providing even more 
evidence for the Causal Difference Hypothesis. 
 More specifically, the effect of Authoritarianism as well as Equality Values remains 
significant (at p<.001) on the Equal Rights dimension27. But Equality Values no longer 
significantly affect Cultural Difference. This offers straightforward evidence that attitudes 
to Cultural Difference do not express, and have to be distinguished from, concerns and 
issues about socioeconomic and individual equality. This is not the case for Socio-Political 
Inclusion, whose relation to Equality Values remains significant, coherent with its 
interpretation in terms of individual equality. 
As far as the Socio-Political Inclusion dimension is concerned, controlling for 
ethnic prejudice does not cancel the effect of Left-Right Identification (which remains 
significant at p<.05, and not significant for the other dimensions). Likewise, the effect of 
Empathy remains maximal and significant for Socio-Political Inclusion (p<.01), but is not 
significant any more on the Equal Rights dimension28. 
                                                 
26
 Note that this holds despite limited sample size and the number of control variables in the model, which makes 
significance a very stringent test. 
27
 Coherent with Sniderman and Hagendoorn’s finding for the Netherlands 
28
 Note that although it could be questionable as to whether the Empathy indicator overlaps with ethnic prejudice, 
here we are considering its net effect, once we have controlled for ethnic prejudice itself. 
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With controls for ethnic prejudice in place, Cultural Difference is still the only 
dimension to be significantly affected by the Perception of Islam29 Furthermore, Cultural 
Difference now is the only dimension to be significantly affected by the Perception of 
Cultural Threat. However, Inter-Group Threat does not significantly affect any dimension 
any more. This confirms and even reinforces the argument that it is the specific cultural 
component of threat that particularly affects Cultural Difference. 
On the whole, from a causal point of view, controlling for ethnic prejudice provides 
more straightforward evidence sustaining the distinction between attitudes towards 
integration related to individual equality on one hand, and cultural difference on the other 
hand from the point of view of their individual causes or independent variables. 
 
    Conclusion 
 
Whereas the management of ethnic diversity in West European societies appears as a key 
political issue – and gave rise to an impressive sum of academic publications – few studies 
dealt with public attitudes on that theme. We started to address this lacuna by 
conceptualizing these attitudes. Mobilizing thinking and knowledge from different fields, we 
made a distinction between issues related to individual equality on one hand, and cultural 
difference on the other hand. The distinction, we argued, is of fundamental relevance from 
many perspectives (philosophical, historical, etc.), and may also matter as far as public 
attitudes are concerned. We then derived a limited number of empirical hypothesis, which we 
tested using data from the unpublished European Group Focus Enmity survey (2008). On the 
whole, results confirmed our expectations. Factor analysis showed that public attitudes 
towards the management of ethnic diversity broke into three dimensions. Two dimensions, 
                                                 
29
 Even though it is so to a lesser extent. 
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Equal Rights and Political Inclusion, deal with ethnic issues in individual equality. But 
whereas the Equal Rights dimension expresses a commitment to the principle of equality per 
se, Political Inclusion reflects the will to go beyond this formal principle, so as to implement 
actual ethnic equality. As far as the management of ethnic diversity is concerned, the 
European public thus hold different conceptions of individual equality – a result which was 
not expected. The third dimension, Cultural Difference, confirmed the salience of the 
distinction between integration issues in individual equality on one hand, and cultural 
difference on the other hand. Results from factor analysis throw light on the lines along 
which issues in the management of ethnic diversity are perceived by the public at large, and 
provide first evidence for future research on that theme. 
Further analysis then confirmed that the different dimensions of integration attitudes 
were distinct both from a consequential as well as causal point of view. Logistic regression 
analysis showed that individual attitudes on each dimension had a significant effect on public 
preferences towards a concrete, precise integration policy. Furthermore, the effect of the 
different dimensions was not overlapping (i.e. the effect of individual attitudes on each 
dimension resisted control for the other dimensions). This means that when it comes to the 
understanding of public preferences towards a concrete integration provision, each dimension 
of integration attitudes virtually matters. In other terms, taking into account the 
multidimensional feature of these attitudes may improve our understanding of current and 
future reactions to integration policies by the public at large – reactions which may impact 
the fate of integration models in democratic societies. Results also showed that the effect of 
each dimension but Equal Rights resisted control for ethnic prejudice itself, i.e. that their 
impact on specific preferences did not confound with the one of previously identified 
variables of ethnic-related attitudes. 
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Finally, multiple regression analysis showed that each dimension differs from the 
other ones in their individual, explanatory variables. In particular, Cultural Difference is the 
only dimension to be significantly affected by the Perception of Islam and the Perception of 
a Cultural Threat. This confirms the way debates and affairs about Islam and cultural 
identity – the scarf affairs in France, the death of Theo Van Gogh in the Netherlands30, etc. – 
impacted the perception of the cultural difference issue in West European societies. Results 
also showed that while attitudes towards individual equality (Socio-Political Inclusion) were 
affected by left-right identification, this was no more the case for Cultural Difference. 
Indeed, whereas individual equality has been a key, historic claim of the Left, left and right 
parties and institutions still have no clear, easily identifiable and distinguishable position on 
cultural difference issues in European societies. This means that future positioning / 
repositioning of the European public on the cultural issue may crucially depends on 
movements and signals from the political elite. So as to provide an accurate picture of how 
and why the public at large supports or resists political options in the management of ethnic 
diversity, future research should pursue the effort of designing indicators allowing accurate 
measurements of these attitudes – a task which has been relatively neglected by attitudinal 
research dealing with ethnicity in the European context. Building on these first results, 
further analyses may throw light on the way integration attitudes differ from one country to 
another, according to contextual variables related notably to migration histories and political 
traditions.  
 
 
                                                 
30
 After he produced the film Submission, which analyzed the treatment of women in Islam, Theo Van Gogh was 
murdered on 2 November 2004 in Amsterdam by the Muslim Mohammed Bouyeri. This revived the debate 
about the integration of Muslim minorities in the Netherlands. 
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Appendix 1: Measurement of the independent variables (percentages of non responses in 
brackets) 
 
 
Prejudice towards Immigrants: (Pearson’s R between items 1 and 2 =.46) 
 
1. Today in [Country], there are too many immigrants (4.9%) 
2. How about Immigrants? [Country] should allow: Many to come and live here / Some / Few / None 
to come and live here ? (2.8%) 
 
Prejudice towards Muslims: (R=.51) 
 
1. There are too many Muslims in this country (1.1%) 
2. How about Muslims? [Country] should allow: Many to come and live here / Some / Few / None to 
come and live here ? (4.5%) 
 
Year of birth (0.4%) / School leaving age (3.2%) / Left-right identification (11.4%) 
 
Authoritarianism: (R=.43) 
 
1. Obedience and respect for authority are among the most important characteristics a person can 
have (0.5%). 
2. To maintain law and order, stronger action should be taken against outsiders and troublemakers 
(1%). 
 
Equality Values: (Cronbach Alpha = .76) 
 
1. Inferior groups should stay in their place (2.7%).  
2. It is probably a good thing that certain groups are at the top, while others are at the bottom 
(1.8%). 
3. Sometimes other groups must be kept in their place (2.2%). 
 
Cultural threat: 
 
― The changes in [country] are threatening our basic values (4.1%). 
 
Perception of Islam: (R=.30) 
 
1. The Islamic culture fits well into the Western world (7.3%).  
2. Muslims’ attitudes toward women are contradictory to our values (5.1%). 
 
Empathy towards immigrants: 
 
— I often feel sorry for immigrants when they are having problems (1.2%). 
 
 
Group Relations Threat: 
 
— In the course of the next few years, do you expect the relationship between different groups in 
our society to improve / to stay about the same / or to get worse (2.8%) 
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Table 1. The dimensions of attitudes towards integration (factor analysis) 
 
Equal Rights 
 
 
Socio-
political 
Inclusion 
Cultural 
Difference 
Newcomers should be satisfied with less .74 -.25 .28 
 
More rights for people who have always lived 
here .84 -.26 .24 
 
Greater right to employment for [country 
natives] .75 -.33 .30 
 
Immigrants should have the right to vote in all 
elections -.22 .77 -.21 
 
Citizenship should be easily obtainable for 
immigrants -.35 .77 -.21 
 
More money invested to support immigrant 
kids -.32 .69 -.42 
Many different religions better for a country -.35 .37 -.61 
 
Immigrants should be able to maintain their 
culture -.23 .37 -.79 
Immigrants should adapt to [country’s] culture .25 -.09 .72 
Explained Variance 31.074 14.198 11.350 
N=46431 
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 Due to the fact that two questions (Cultural Difference dimension) were included in a split procedure, sample 
size is divided by a half. 
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Table 2: Logistic regression models predicting preferences towards the headscarf 
policy (“Muslim girls should not be allowed to wear it at school”) 
 
  MODEL 1 MODEL 2 
Intercept 1.084 1.087 
  (0.446) (0.436) 
Equal Rights      0.725*** 0.859 
  (0.008) (0.275) 
Socio-Political Inclusion      0.720***    0.760** 
  (0.006) (0.026) 
Cultural Recognition      1.443***  1.290** 
  (0.002) (0.05) 
Prejudice / migrants  0.966 
   (0.818) 
Prejudice / Muslims     0.674** 
   (0.017) 
R² 0.156 0.180 
No. of individuals 41032 410 
*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 (two-tailed) ; reference category = “Muslim girls should be 
allowed to wear it at school” 
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 Due to the fact that two questions (Cultural Difference dimension) were included in a split procedure, sample 
size is divided by a half. 
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Table 3. Variables expected to affect the different dimensions of attitudes towards integration 
Equal Rights Socio-political Inclusion Cultural Difference Control variables 
Authoritarianism Left-right Identification Perception of Islam Age 
Equality Values Empathy towards Perception of  Education 
  Ethnic Minorities Cultural Threat 
  
      Inter-group Threat 
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Table 4. Compared Effect of Selected Individual Variables on Each Dimension of Attitudes 
Towards Integration (multiple regression; standardized coefficients) 
 
  MODEL 1   MODEL 2  
 
 
Equal 
Rights 
Socio-Pol. 
Inclusion 
Cultural 
Difference 
Equal 
Rights 
Socio-Pol. 
Inclusion 
Cultural 
Difference 
Intercept (.296) (.115) (.278) (.982) (.319) (.141) 
Age .045 -.076 .060 -.001 -.044 .079 
 (.332) (.160) (.268) (.978) (.394) (.141) 
Education .051 .105** .000 .054 .093* -.011 
 (.245) (.039) (.993) (.176) (.053) (.830) 
Left-Right  .021 
   -.134*** -.030 -.002 .105** -.009 
Identification (.635) (.008) (.551) (.963) (.029) (.853) 
Equality Values .435***    -.171***    -.120** .328*** -.069* -.053 
 (.000) (.001) (.019) (.000) (.075) (.311) 
Authoritarianism -.235*** .020 .033     -.141*** -.051 -.016 
 (.000) (.701) (.522) (.001) (.318) (.761) 
Perception of 
Islam -.091 -.069 
   -.193*** -.016 .061 .081* 
 (.109) (.193) (.000) (.721) (.265) (.076) 
Cultural Threat -.100** .040 .169*** -.049 .003 .145*** 
 (.020) (.418) (.001) (.214) (.946) (.003) 
Group Relations  .083** -.105** -.097** .044 -.069 -.078 
Threat (.047) (.033) (.050) (.251) (.138) (.104) 
Empathy .088**    -.211*** -.074* .060    -.168***    -.109** 
 (.040) (.000) (.057) (.127) (.000) (.028) 
Prejudice /    
     -.327*** .188*** .098 
Immigrants     (.000) (.003) (.134) 
Prejudice /    
   -.111** 120*** .218*** 
Muslims     (.037) (.008) (.001) 
R² .393 .171 .179 .498 .267 .227 
N 375 375 375 375 375 375 
***p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1 (two-tailed) 
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